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ABSTRACT
Discovering and exploiting the causality in deep neural
networks (DNNs) are crucial challenges for understanding
and reasoning causal effects (CE) on an explainable visual
model. ”Intervention” has been widely used for recognizing
a causal relation ontologically. In this paper, we propose
a causal inference framework for visual reasoning via do-
calculus. To study the intervention effects on pixel-level fea-
tures for causal reasoning, we introduce pixel-wise masking
and adversarial perturbation. In our framework, CE is calcu-
lated using features in a latent space and perturbed prediction
from a DNN-based model. We further provide the first look
into the characteristics of discovered CE of adversarially per-
turbed images generated by gradient-based methods 1. Exper-
imental results show that CE is a competitive and robust index
for understanding DNNs when compared with conventional
methods such as class-activation mappings (CAMs) on the
Chest X-Ray-14 dataset for human-interpretable feature(s)
(e.g., symptom) reasoning. Moreover, CE holds promises
for detecting adversarial examples as it possesses distinct
characteristics in the presence of adversarial perturbations.
Index Terms— Causal Reasoning, Adversarial Example,
Adversarial Robustness, Interpretable Deep Learning
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, deep neural networks (DNNs) based models
have demonstrated a significant improvement in state-of-
the-art results for several vision tasks [1, 2]. Despite their
effectiveness, DNNs are notoriously cryptic for their com-
plexity, opacity, and lacking apparent relationship between
neural architecture and the function being evaluated by the
network. These challenges are amplified especially when
DNN models show superior performance over conventional
methods (e.g., decision-trees) on human-interpretable fea-
ture learning tasks, such as clinical (i.e., cancer recognition
[3]), emotional (i.e., violence detection [4]), and social (i.e.,
behavior reasoning [5]) patterns recognition, where even
experts did not fully reach a proper consensus. Therefore,
∗Authors contributed equally to this work
1 https://github.com/jjaacckkyy63/Causal-Intervention-AE-wAdvImg
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Fig. 1. Visual intervention in three classical causal condi-
tions [11]: (I) X → Y for single class counterfactual reason-
ing; (II) X ← Y for multi-classes counterfactual reasoning,
and (III) Z ← X → Y for conditional multitasking counter-
factual reasoning of a visual perceptual-model.
interpretability [6] and explainable reasoning features of
DNNs remain challenging. From regulatory aspects (e.g.,
GDPR [7]), human-interpretable feature selection is crucial
for administrative decision-making, as current DNNs highly
depend on supervised labels generated by human knowledge
but barely explain the learned relationship between its labeled
input-feature(s) and predicted output(s). The importance of
reasoning is also motivated by demystifying the vulnerable
properties of DNNs against adversarial examples [8, 9, 10].
This paper studies the problems of causal interpretability
on DNNs for vision tasks. We propose a new visual reason-
ing method inspired by causal inference embedded DNNs
and verify its sensitivity on input masking and adversarial
perturbations. We summarize some input intervention-based
explanation methods for DNNs as follows.
Saliency map based method. Many works employ saliency
map for visual explanations. Class activation mappings
[12] (CAMs) have provided visual explanations via trac-
ing gradient-based localization. Gradient information from a
penultimate convolutional layer was used in GradCAM [13]
to identify discriminating patterns in input images. How-
ever, CAM-based methods have some limitations on causal
reaonsing. They could only conclude that a DNN model
would feature with certain localized patterns. Denoting a
trained DNNs model as Y and input data as X , CAM-
based mothods can be viewed as a reverse causation (e.g.,
Xinput
DNN Model−−−−−−−→←−−−
CAM
Youtput). Saliency maps [12, 13] only
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establish a correlation for interpretability while it is possible
to trace a particular image region that is responsible for it to
be correctly classified; it cannot elucidate what would happen
if a certain portion of the image was masked out. See [11]
for a What If question, when a classifier is used in the wild.
In addition to this causal reasoning weakness, recent study
also shows CAMs barely preserve robustness from a gradient
adversarial attacks as a secure reasoning index [14].
Adversarial robustness. Although there has recently been
a great deal of research in adversarial defenses, many of
these methods are later shown to be broken [15]. The most
common, brute force solution is adversarial training, where
we simply include a mixture of normal and adversarially-
generated examples in the training set [16]. One obvious
limitation of previous work is the robustness generalizability
for adversarial examples beyond the pre-defined norm or dis-
tributional constraints.
Causal reasoning. Building causal interpretations toward
evaluating a robust and interpretable DNNs are still largely
unexplored. Causality as a means of explanation has deep
roots for factor selection and has received many attentions.
The rest of this paper is presented as follows. First, we de-
scribe a general framework to build a causal inference to rea-
son over a targeted DNN model via intervention. Second, we
discover adversarial robustness between causal factor. Lastly,
we propose an adversary-sensitive feature-map to visualize
the causal effects of interpreterable features (e.g., symptoms)
toward large-scale medical datasets by using DenseNet [2].
Our contributions include:
• The design of a causal inference framework for calcu-
lating CE on single task, multi-labels, and multitasking
vision tasks. An autoencoder network has been intro-
duced for intervening interpretable feature(s).
• The investigation of CE toward highlighting counter-
factual intervention by pixel-wise masking and adver-
sarial settings.
• A case study for learning the causal effects from a
large-scale medical dataset (Chest X-Ray-14) for rea-
soning related chest symptoms by Causal Effect Map
(CEM).
2. RELATED WORKS
Causal models have been advocated as a proper method [17]
for parameter reasoning in a complex system. Modeling bias
and fairness as a counterfactual [17] is a new way to quan-
tify the bias of models. Ideas from causal inference have also
been used in providing comprehensive explanations of deep
learning models. In [18], a method is developed to build a
causal model over human-centric image-based abstractions of
the model, which helps provide the ability to allow users to
propose comprehensive queries. With an interpretable con-
cept, the method could learn a causal model relating to net-
work activations and features for classifications. Moreover,
as DNNs can be viewed as a graphical model for inference,
recent work in [19] proposed using Structural Causal Mod-
els (SCM) to reason over a deep-learning model. The tech-
nique includes building the direct acyclic graph (DAG) struc-
ture from the DNN, applying a suitable transformation and
estimating the causal effect using causal inference.
3. VISUAL CAUSAL INTERVENTION
3.1. Causal Theory
We adopt the widely-accepted Causal Effect (CE) from
Pearl’s do-calculus2 for do(Xi = xi) ≡ xi = fi(pai, ui),
where pai are the parents of variable Xi in a graph, G. Se-
lecting two disjoint sets of random variables, X and Y , the
causal effect of X on Y is denoted as P (y|do(x)), which is
a function from X to the space of probability distributions on
Y . As an illustration, here we introduce a graph G including
random variables X,Y,Z in Figure 1 for constructing ele-
mental causal networks for this study.
Computing the Effect of Intervention An atomic interven-
tion do(Xi = x′i) has been used in the previous study [18]
as a truncated factorization for feature selection in a la-
tent space of a targeted DNN system for causal reasoning.
Given a joint distribution P(O,P,X), over a set of DNN with
outputs O, inputs P, and intermediate variables X, from the
definition in [20], measuring CE of an intervention on x′i on
Xj = xj with all of the evidence Z could be computed as:
Effect(xi → xj , Z) = P (xj |do(x′i), ZXi)− P (xj |ZXi)
(1)
The excepted casual effect from Eqn. 6 in [18] has been de-
fined as:
EXi [Effect(xi → xj , Z)] =
∑
xi∈Xi
P (Xi = xi|Z)× (1)
(2)
Then, we adapt the method in (2) on DNN model with (I)
single task, (II) multiple tasks, and (III) multiple labels from
Figure.1 for computing expected-CE analysis, where ZXi is
a counterfactual setting.
Interventions as Variables Different from previous ap-
proaches to directly measuring the intervened result for cal-
culating CE, alternatively, an intervention do(Xi = x′i) could
be encoded by adding toG a link Fi → Xi, where Fi is a new
variable taking values in {do(x′i), idle}. Here, the notion of
“idle” means “no intervention” following Pearl’s Eqn. 3.8
[11]. In this paper, we adapt this concept by introducing
masking and adversarial intervention as Fi variables for dis-
covering CE within the DNN in a zero-out evident state, Z0.
This conditional probability could be calculated by:
2We use do-operator do(·) as conditional intervention following by the
original definition in Pearl 2009 [11].
P (xi|pa′i) =
P (xi|pai) if F1 = idle,0 if Fi = do(x′i) and xi 6= x′i,
1 if Fi = do(x
′
i) and xi = x
′
i.
(3)
The advantages of this augmented causal graph in (3) are its
capability for showing the ramification of spontaneous change
in fi from Fi instead of merely replacing fi by a constant.
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Fig. 2. Framework and deep network topology. We use pixel-
wise masking as Fi and adversarial examples as Fj interven-
tion variables in the Z0 (zero-out) counterfactual setting.
3.2. Concept extraction by Autoencoder
Autoencoder networks Our autoencoder consists of five
convolutional layers. The encoder and decoder each have
two symmetrical layers, and they aim to capture the textural
features corresponding to human visual perception. However,
our decoder reconstructs slightly altered network activations
while ensuring significant downstream network activations
are unaffected. We mainly designed a low-dimensional layer
in the middle to integrate scattered features into concepts.
This is inspired by how our brain pays attention, processes
information and interpretsthe perceived inputs.
Build up a Causal Baseline To attain better causality mea-
surement, we trained our model with a designed loss function
composed of three parts from the existing studies [18] as
casual baseline: interpretability loss, shallow reconstruction
loss, and deep reconstruction loss. Shallow reconstruction
loss is simply the L1 norm of the difference between the
input and output of autoencoder to represent the activations
of the network. Also, we applied the deep reconstruction
loss in the form of the KL-divergence between the output
probability distribution of original and autoencoder-inserted
network. Our total loss function for the causality model is
(from Harradon et al. 2018 Eqn. 7 in [18]):
L(θ;xi) = λshallow×Lshallow(θ;xi)+λdeep×Ldeep(θ;xi)
+ λinterpretability × Linterpretability(θ;xi) (3)
Our method is based on the proposed loss in the previous
work [18] to reproduce the measurement of causality.
3.3. Intervention Methods
In the zero-out (Z0) setting, we discuss two types of pertur-
bation as independent intervention variables for computing
expected-CE: (1) pixel-wise masking (PWM) and (2) adver-
sarial noise. The purpose of pixel-wise perturbation, Fi, is
to recognize the causal relationship between a local pixel
and the final output result of a DNN. We apply the following
adversarial noises on images as another intervention Fj .
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [21] is a gradient-based adversarial noise
to generate adversarial examples by one step gradient update
along the direction of the sign of gradient at each pixel.
Jacobian-Based Saliency Map (JBSM) Attack Papernot et
al. [22] designed an efficient saliency adversarial map, called
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack by saturating a few pix-
els in a given image to their maximum or minimum values.
BIM and PGD Attacks Kurakin et al. [16] applied extended
Fast Gradient Sign method by running a finer optimiza-
tion (smaller change) for multiple iterations Basic Iterative
Method (BIM) attack. Projected gradient descent (PGD)
attack has been introduced by subjecting to a constraint [16].
4. EXPERIMENTS
We use three benchmark image datasets which have been
proved robust to reassure that the causal effect would not be
compromised by the defect of data. The datasets are fashion-
MNIST, ImageNet and NIH-ChestX-Ray-14. We investigate
X → Y for single feature causal intervention. For adversarial
setting in our experiments, we use maximum L∞ perturab-
tion strength  = 0.3 and iterative steps = 10.
Numerical Validation on Bird Dataset In previous work,
the VGG19 [23] model applied to bird200 [24] had significant
causal effect with intervention at layer 18 feature 2. In our
work, we also use VGG19 to reproduce the procedure and test
the causality by intervening the same position. The expect
causal effect is 7.6341× 10−3, which suffices to validate our
method and proved the potential of better interpretability.
4.1. Quantitative Study on NIH-ChestX-Ray-14
NIH-ChestX-Ray-14 [25] is the largest available chest Xray
dataset. Despite of anatomical obstacles, CheXNet model
could attain competitive classification performance with radi-
ologists [26]. Different from various classes in ImageNet, the
interpretable patterns in ChestX-ray14 are clinical symptoms,
which could only be recognized by radiologists and hardly
identified by CAM against adversarial setting in Figure 3.
CheXNet We implemented CheXNet [26] as a 121-layer con-
volutional neural network trained on ChestX-ray14 dataset
contains frontal-view chest X-ray images and labeled with up
to 14 different thoracic diseases. We modified the DenseNet121
model by replacing the final fully connected layer and apply
a sigmoid layer. We use Adam with 0.001 learning rate, β1
as 0.9, β2 as 0.999. We choose binary cross entropy, and the
classifier ended up achieved 85.08% accuracy. Besides, we
investigate Y → X by masking the known symptoms and
generate negative Expected-CE as −1.624 × 10−4, which
provides inference. For Z ← X → Y , we zero-out the nodes
which activate additional feature identified as a pulmonary
disease as an additional label suggested by a pulmonologist.
However, CE of this multitasking reasoning is not obvious.
Intervention by pixel-wise Masking For PWM, we inter-
vene with the visual traits of inputs. We mask 10 % area of
the images randomly to explore the impact of masking on the
causal effect. We could assure the intervention without bias
with a chance to observe the region of interest of the causal
model. The results in Table 1, 3, and 4 show the value of
Expected-CE deceases by PWM, which indicate a declined
causal importance inferences by pixel-wise perturbation.
Intervention by Adversarial Attacks From Table 2., we
observe a numerical difference of Expected-CE by four
gradient-based adversarial attacks, where FGSM has a larger
negative causal effect with -5.6129 ×10−6. We then adapt
FGSM to evaluate generic datasets in Section 4.2.
The presence of malicious adversarial-noise via CAMs
such as (I) in Fig. 3 is often hardly to detect if the dataset has
similar visual patterns (e.g., clinical patterns). We propose
an adversary-sensitive causal effect map (CEM) by activated
weights of CE in Eqn. 1 on each pixel toward classifying a
specific class.
Table 1. Expected-CE on CheXNet
Level(L), Node(N) Z0 Fi = PWM
3,4 4.5076×10−3 7.2356×10−7
6,5 2.843×10−3 1.2154×10−5
6,10 3.1939×10−3 9.0066×10−6
8,5 3.1939×10−3 1.1536×10−5
10,7 1.3775×10−2 -1.1506×10−5
Table 2. CheXNet (Fj on L = 10, N = 7)
Fj = Types of Adversarial Attack Expected-CE
FSGM -5.6129×10−6
BIM 4.3435×10−5
JBSM 7.7548×10−5
PGD -3.9605×10−6
4.2. Other Image Classification Datasets
Fashion-MNIST The fashion-MNIST dataset comprises of
28×28 grayscale images of 70,000 fashion products from 10
categories, with 7,000 images per category. [27]. We use shal-
low model consists of 2 convolutional layers. The weights are
trained using Adam with initial learning rate 0.001. We train
the model using minibatches of size 100. The classifier with
lowest validation loss has 89.6% accuracy.
ImageNet The ImageNet [28] 2012 classification dataset con-
sists 1.2 million images for training, and 50,000 for valida-
tion, from 1, 000 classes. As a benchmark dataset, we use it
to demonstrate visual causality. We use VGG16 model which
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Fig. 3. Sensitivity for adversarial setting between (I) Class
Activation Map (CAM) [12] and (II) Causal Effect Map
(CEM) on ChestX-ray 14 for clinical symptoms labels [26].
Table 3. Expected-CE on Fashion-MNIST
L, N Z0 Fi = PWM Fj = FGSM
2,3 4.9543×10−4 -1.8947×10−5 -8.0042×10−6
2,7 2.4600×10−4 -4.1068×10−5 -2.5742×10−5
has 16 convolutional layers and is pretrained by ImageNet
with 86% top-1 accuracy.
Table 4. Expected-CE on ImageNet
L, N Z0 Fi = PWM Fj = FGSM
3,2 4.2027×10−4 6.0993×10−5 -5.1834×10−5
9,10 8.9322×10−3 7.2438×10−5 - 2.8862×10−4
13,6 6.7643×10−4 2.3943×10−6 -6.8749×10−5
4.3. Evaluation of Causal Effect
To validate the reliability of our approach, we also imple-
mented our causal inference framework on Fashion-MNIST
and ImageNet. We applied random pixel-wise feature mask-
ing and adversarial noise separately to the input images with
Z0 coded feature map. Table 3 and 4 show that comparing
to Z0, Expected-CE of these two datasets decreased drasti-
cally once we applied random masking and adversarial noise,
which are similar to the results of CheXNet. The results sug-
gest that our causality framework is generic and can be ap-
plied to different datasets (please refer our reproducible code.)
5. CONCLUSION
With our proposed framework, experimental results on Fashion-
MNIST, ImageNet, and ChestX-ray14 datasets show that CE
is a competitive and robust index for understanding DNNs
for generic and human-interpretable feature(s) reasoning. CE
also shows high sensitivity in the presence of adversarial per-
turbations and could be used to identify adversarial examples.
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